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This paper provides estimates for the base elasticities of Dutch taxes, paying 
particular attention to differences between short-and long-term elasticities, 
and allowing for asymmetric adjustment. Estimates are presented for five tax 
categories for the period 1970-2005, after making appropriate corrections for 
effects of discretionary tax measures. The empirical results indicate that short-
term elasticities often are lower than long-term ones, notably when taxes are 
subdued. Consequently, shocks to tax revenues tend to be aggravated by the 
dynamics of short-term elasticities. Ignoring differences between short- and 
long-term elasticities contributes to revenue ‘surprises’ and an incorrect 
assessment of the fiscal stance.  
 
 
Keywords: Tax revenue, income elasticity, fiscal indicators, The Netherlands 
JEL classification: H2, H62, H68 
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The responsiveness of government tax revenues to macroeconomic 
developments is an important variable in forecasting tax revenues in 
preparation of next year’s fiscal budget. It is also a key input for cyclically-
adjusting budgetary variables. In the European context, cyclically-adjusted 
balances are used frequently for assessing whether countries progress 
sufficiently quickly towards a sound budgetary position or have already 
reached such level. The relevance of accurate tax elasticities was recently 
highlighted when tax receipts in many European countries improved by much 
more than could be accounted for by combining economic growth rates with 
standard tax elasticities. 
 
Tax elasticities usually are considered constant over time although there are 
good grounds to expect it to fluctuate over time. As an example, short-term 
fluctuations in household income may have a more-than-proportional effect on 
consumption of luxury items (being highly-taxed), which would be reflected in 
higher VAT-revenues. The short-term elasticity, measuring the percentage 
change in tax receipts in case of a 1% change in the tax base, in that case 
would exceed the long-term one. Short-term elasticities may not only vary 
over time but may also behave in an asymmetrical manner.  
 
This paper considers short- and long-term elasticities of tax revenues with 
regard to their bases, a distinction usually ignored in European tax research. 
In estimating long-term elasticities, we take into account possible sources of 
bias and inconsistency in estimating co-integrated relations in levels, via 
DOLS-estimation and Newey-West correction. As to the short-term 
elasticities, which are estimated in changes-in-logs form, we include error-
correction terms reflecting deviations of actual tax receipts form the long-term 
equilibrium level. In doing so, we allow for asymmetries in the tax revenue 
response to the base. 
 
Estimates refer to the Netherlands, being one of the very few countries to 
publish long series on discretionary tax measures. This allows for deriving tax 
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revenue series that are cleaned of discretionary measures, and thus reflect 
endogenous tax revenue growth. This proves to be important as discretionary 
measures over the estimation period of 1971-2005 on balance increased 
indirect tax receipts and lowered direct tax receipts. Not correcting the series 
would result in biased estimates of the elasticities. We not only take account 
of the impact of such measures on tax receipts in the current year but also in 
other years.  
 
The outcomes for the 5 central government tax categories distinguished 
confirm differences between short-term and long-term tax elasticity values, 
especially for direct taxes (personal income tax, corporate income tax, and 
other direct taxes). Differences are especially large in “bad times” (tax receipts 
below the long-run equilibrium). The outcomes in most cases also indicate 
asymmetry in tax-to-base elasticities. When tax receipts are above the long-
term value, elasticities tend to be higher, likely indicating shifts in consumption 
patterns towards more luxury (higher-taxed) goods and services, reduced 
possibilities for corporations to compensate profits with past losses, and less 
cautious dividend pay-out policies. The error-correction term is significant in 
all short-term equations, but there is only evidence of an asymmetric effect of 
the error-correction term for VAT-receipts. While error-correction terms may 
not be interpreted directly as cyclical indicators, some correlation seems to be 
in place, pointing to pro-cyclical elasticities. 
 
Failure to distinguish between short-term and long-term revenue elasticities 
therefore add to ‘budget surprises’, which in fact rather reflect forecast 
inadequacies. Such appears to be the case particularly in times of negative 
surprises (tax receipts being below the long-term value), especially for direct 
taxes. Ignoring such aspects may also contribute to inaccurate calculations of 
the (cyclically-adjusted) fiscal indicators on which policy actions or 









The responsiveness of government tax revenues to macroeconomic 
developments is a key variable for fiscal policy, used for instance by 
governments in forecasting revenue growth when preparing budgets. In the 
European context, the tax elasticity plays a role in setting minimum 
benchmarks for budget balances that reduce chances of deficits surpassing 
the 3% of GDP limit in cyclical downturns. It also is used in estimating 
cyclically-adjusted balances, which in the European context are used 
intensively, e.g. for assessing progress towards sound public finances. The 
relevance of accurate tax elasticities was demonstrated in 2005 and 2006 
when tax receipts in many European countries improved more than could be 
accounted for by combining economic growth rates with standard elasticities. 
 
The tax elasticities used for the purposes above is often a constant over time 
although there are good grounds to expect it to fluctuate over time. For 
instance, short-term household income fluctuations may affect luxury 
consumption items, being highly-taxed, more than proportional, causing a 
higher short-term elasticity. Another example could be that firms attempt to 
avoid cuts in distributed dividend in economic downturns to uphold 
shareholders’ confidence, with changes in dividend policies and thus in tax 
revenues mainly occurring in good economic times. The latter example not 
only shows that short-term elasticities may vary over time, but also that 
asymmetries can be at play.  
 
Ignoring short-term behaviour of elasticities leads to biased fiscal indicators. It 
may be a source of systematic over- and underestimation of tax receipts
2, 
which may induce unwarranted fiscal policy responses, e.g. government 
overspending in case of tax overestimation. In addition, using incorrect 
                                                 
2 Such applies in particular if in the short-run elasticities are pro-cyclically, thus reinforcing the tax 
revenue effect of a positive growth shock via a higher value of the elasticity. 
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elasticity values can lead to an inaccurate assessment of the fiscal stance.
3 
Finally, from a longer-term perspective, differences in short- and long-term 
elasticities allow circumventing a trade-off between tax revenue growth and 
stability of tax revenues: in principle, high (long-term) growth rates can be 
combined with short-term stability in taxes, and vice versa. An appropriate 
selection of taxes may deliver a tax portfolio closer to the tax frontiers, taking 
account of preferences regarding tax revenue growth and stability (see 
Seyfried and Pantuosco, 2003, for an application to US state taxes).  
 
This paper focuses on both long- and short-run elasticities for the 
Netherlands. Apart from paying attention to long-term elasticities that measure 
the growth of tax receipts over time, we focus on estimating short-term 
elasticities, being an ignored aspect in European tax-research. Another 
contribution of this paper is that we take into account possible sources of bias 
and inconsistency in long-run estimates of co-integrated relations. In the 
short-run estimates, apart from including error-correction terms, we allow for 
asymmetries in the tax revenue response to the base. This is applied to the 
Netherlands, being one of the very few countries publishing long series on 
discretionary tax measures. This series allows for deriving tax revenue series 
that are cleaned of discretionary measures, and thus reflect endogenous tax 
revenue growth.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the importance of 
distinguishing between short-term and long-term elasticities of tax receipts. 
Furthermore, it highlights the merits of correcting tax series for discretionary 
tax measures to avoid biased estimates. Section 3 describes main features of 
the tax system in the Netherlands. Section 4 contains the estimation 
outcomes, while the final section contains our conclusions.  
                                                 
3 The fiscal stance usually is measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Using 
too low a value of the elasticity would lead to underestimating the cyclical budgetary component, with 
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2.  Defining the elasticity of taxes 
 
We focus in this paper on the base elasticity of taxes, measuring the 
endogenous growth in tax receipts following a 1% change in the tax base. 
Two key elements in this definition requiring further elaboration are the time-
period over which the 1% change in the base is measured, and the concept of 
endogenous tax growth.  
 
As to the time-frame, figure 1 shows two hypothetical tax series that co-move 
with long-term growth of the base and with the business cycle.
4 Regressions 
of tax receipt levels on the tax base will deliver the same value for the (long-
term) elasticity, given identical trends. However, their short-run responses 
differ, the cyclically-sensitive one fluctuating much more in line with the 
business cycle or, in other words, acting more strongly as an automatic 
stabiliser. The short-term elasticity measures the immediate change in tax 
receipts if the tax base changes by 1 percent. 
 







cyclically-insensitive tax cyclically-sensitive tax
 
 
Views on whether high or low values of the short-term tax revenue elasticities 
are preferable seem to differ across the Atlantic. US-oriented literature points 
to large cyclical tax variability as a nuisance for complying with state fiscal 
rules which often require annual balanced (current) budgets. In such a 
                                                 
4 The example is close to the one shown in Sobel and Holcombe (1996). 
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context, countercyclical elasticities are preferred, giving rise to relatively 
stable tax revenue growth (Fox and Campbell, 1984).
5 In Europe, however, 
swaying tax receipts with the cycle is regarded as an important 
macroeconomic stabilisation tool as countries in the euro area face 
centralised monetary policy, limitations on the size of the budget deficit, no 
European cyclical cross-country transfer system, and limited price and wage 
flexibility. This is recognised in the Stability and Growth Pact which commits 
countries to aim for small deficits or even surpluses so that there is room for 
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely without surpassing the 3% of GDP 
deficit threshold in a ‘normal’ downturn.  
 
Derivation of elasticity values is most commonly done via macroeconomic 
models, via theoretical considerations regarding income elasticities, and via 
time-series analysis (Van den Noord, 2000).
6 Our approach focuses on the 
latter given the emphasis we want to give to the time-varying properties of the 
elasticities. Apart from standard fixed coefficient regression analysis, time-
series approaches can also include the random coefficient approach (Otsuka 
and Braun, 1999) and the variable elasticity approach (Fox and Campbell, 
1984). However, doing so requires more detailed data over a long period than 
are available in the Dutch case at hand. 
 
Time-series analysis also allows for econometrically taking into account the 
analytical distinction between long- and short-term elasticities. Many tax 
revenue series have a unit root and require differencing once to obtain 
stationarity. Long-term elasticities then can be estimated as follows: 
 
log T05,t = θ + δ log Bt + γt        [1] 
 
With   T05,t  = tax revenue in year t adjusted for discretionary measures 
θ = intercept 
Bt= tax base in year t 
                                                 
5 Many US states have rainy day-funds in place to further reduce the impact of tax variability on the 
budget. 
6 See Creedy and Gemmell, 2004, for a good example for the UK. 
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γ  = error 
 
while for the short-term elasticity, a difference-equation is taken to arrive at 
stationary series:  
 
∆ log T05,t = α + β.∆ log Bt + εt       [2] 
 
Making this distinction is a correct procedure provided the levels of tax 
receipts and the bases are co-integrated, and the difference equation is 
stationary. The error-correction term derived from long-term equation [1], i.e. 
the one-year lagged difference between the actual tax revenue and the 
longer-run equilibrium value of taxes, then can be added to the short-term 
equation, reflecting that deviations from the long-run path may have an impact 
on short-term tax receipts: 
 
∆ log T05,t =  α + β.∆ log Bt + λ. γt-1 + εt                                                          [3] 
 
with λ referred to as the adjustment parameter, indicating the percentage of 
last year’s deviation being corrected in the current period. 
 
Short-term changes in tax revenues thus may come from two channels: 
directly, via changes in the tax base, and indirectly, via deviations from the 
longer-term path. This can lead to a situation where the tax base declines but, 
due to the effect of the error-correction, tax revenues nevertheless increase. 
Ignoring the error-correction term may result in rather poor estimation results 
and biased coefficients.  
 
A further refinement allows for the strength of the attraction to be different on 
both sides of the attractor in the short-run tax response. One way of testing 
this is to distinguish between positive and negative values of the error-
correction term (Granger and Lee,1989).  
 
∆ log T05,t = α + β. ∆ log Bt  + λ1. γ t -1
+ + λ2. γ t -1
-
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This is equivalent to including a dummy variable, taking value 1 in case of a 
positive error-correction term and zero else, and interact it with the error-
correction term. In addition, asymmetric responses can also stem from the 
base-elasticity varying. This can be tested by interacting the dummy with the 
tax base variable as shown in equation 5.   
 
∆ log T05,t = α + β.∆ log Bt  + σ. Dec.∆ log B t + λ. γ t -1  + π. Dec, t -1. γ t -1 + ε t [5] 
 
With Dec, = Dummy with value 1 if the error-correction term is positive, and 0 
otherwise. 
Thus, if tax receipts are below equilibrium, the coefficient on the base is β, 
while above equilibrium (when Dec is 1) it is β +σ.  The coefficient σ should 
normally be positive as tax revenues above equilibrium result from above-
average elasticity values. Similarly, the adjustment parameter on the error-
correction term is λ when taxes were below-equilibrium in the previous period 
and λ + π when they were above. This approach, akin to Bruce et al. (2006), 
will be applied in section 4. It has the advantage of allowing both the base and 
the adjustment parameter to respond asymmetrically depending on actual 
receipts being above or below equilibrium, but a potential drawback is that 
outcomes are less transparent while the ease of application is smaller as 
elasticity-values are state-dependent (Dye, 2004).  
 
Properly measuring of endogenous growth of tax receipts requires removing 
the effects of discretionary measures on tax revenues. In particular, correction 
is required for any policy-decisions regarding tax rates, the tax base or the 
efficiency or timing of collecting taxes to avoid biased estimates for the 
elasticities.  
 
One way of dealing with discretionary changes is derive tax revenue 
elasticities from “theoretical” approaches, as done by many international 
organisations. For instance, base elasticities of indirect taxes often are set at 
value 1, assuming no shifts in the pattern of consumption between the 
products and services in categories with different tax rates. Short-term 
12
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fluctuations in the tax elasticities therefore are not taken into account. Another 
approach is to ignore or circumvent the issue. An example of the first is given 
by Ginebri et al. (2005), estimating tax buoyancy rather than a tax elasticity, 
while the second one is often applied in US-related literature (e.g. Sobel and 
Holcombe, 1996), focussing on the tax base-to-GDP elasticity rather than the 
base elasticity of tax receipts .  
 
The tax series used in this paper are cleaned for discretionary measures 
using the proportional adjustment method (see Prest, 1962). Mathematically, 
the proportional adjustment method can be expressed as follows: 
T05,05 = T05          [6] 
T05,04,
 =  T04 *    T05         [7] 
                       T04,05   
T05,t     =  Tt   * T t+1  * ..…* T05 
                        Tt,t+1 * …. .*T04,05                            [8] 
    
with   T05,t  = tax revenue in year t if tax structure of year 2005 would prevail 
  Tt       = actual tax revenue in year t 
  Tt,t+1 = Tt+1 - Dt+1 
       D t       = amount of discretionary measures taken in year t  
 
We set the base-year at the most recent year in our sample, 2005, so that 
derived elasticities reflect recent tax structures. Equation 8 gives the more 
general formula. One advantage of using this approach is that in principle it 
results in a constant long-term elasticity, which facilitates the estimation 
process.  
 
The usefulness of applying this method depends crucially on the availability 
and quality of estimates of revenue losses or gains from discretionary 
measures. We use estimates from the Dutch ministry of finance, which refer 
to ex-ante forecasts of the effect of measures on tax receipts in the year of 
implementation. This series has the advantage of going back relatively far 
(1970) and of being consistent but some drawbacks should also be listed. 
Lacking ex-post adjustments, it inevitably includes forecast errors.
  
Furthermore, endogenous behavioural responses are usually not taken into 
account as are cross-tax effects (the effect of a tax rate increase for one tax 
category for the revenue of another tax). Finally, the focus on revenue losses 
or gains in the initial year in some cases may imply that only part of the total 
effect is captured, e.g. if it takes time for measures to really take off. Despite 
such limitations, it is an indispensable source of information for time-series 
analysis. 
 
3.  Tax revenues in the Netherlands 
 
The tax revenues taken into account in our study refer to Dutch central 
government tax receipts, excluding social security contributions and other 
current revenues as data on discretionary measures for these latter 
categories were not available.
7 Data on tax revenues and on revenue effects 
of discretionary measures refer to accrual-based revenues. Annex 1 contains 
details on characteristics of the series and their sources. 
 
We separate the three main taxes, being value-added tax (VAT), personal 
income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT). The PIT includes the wage 
tax, which is a withholding tax for the personal income tax, taxation of non-
wage income of individuals, as well as business income from retail business. 
The corporate income tax includes profits from all (large) corporations, 
including those from natural gas-exploitation. In 2005, the VAT, the PIT and 
the CIT accounted for 32, 26 and 16% of total central government tax 
revenues respectively. All other central government taxes are included in 
‘other indirect taxes’ (22% of total tax receipts, mainly excise and stamp 
duties, a special tax on new cars, environmental taxes and taxes on judicial 
matters) and ‘other direct taxes’ (4% of total tax receipts, mainly dividend 
withholding tax and inheritance tax). 
 
                                                 
7 Central government tax revenues account for around 50% of total general government, the other items 
being social security contributions, regional and local tax receipts, and non-tax receipts, representing 
about 30%, 15% and 5% of total general government income, respectively. 
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Figure 2 shows that the overall tax burden has remained fairly stable over 
time in the Netherlands, hovering around 24% of GDP. Its composition has 
changed, however, with indirect taxes gaining weight and personal income 
taxes becoming less important in the tax mix. Such reflects discretionary 
decisions as well as, more recently, the endogenous growth of personal 
income tax allowances and deductions (e.g. deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments and of private pension premiums). 
 
Figure 2. Tax level and composition in the Netherlands, 1971-2005 
















Table 1 presents information on the sources of growth of tax receipts as 
percentage of GDP over the sample 1971-2005, decomposed in the effect of 
discretionary measures and the effect of growth, the latter calculated 
residually. At the aggregate level, revenue effects of discretionary measures 
have been relatively limited over the years 1971-2005. For indirect taxes, the 
revenue-raising measures more than compensated the endogenous decrease 
in tax receipts as percentage of GDP. The picture for direct taxes is 
distinctively different, with the tax-to-GDP ratio increasing without measures, 
but discretionary measures on average lowering tax receipts. Only in the case 
of the personal income taxes did the combination of measures and 
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Table 1. 1971-2005 tax revenue growth: endogenous and discretionary 
effects, % (-point) of GDP 
















Value-added tax  5.8  3.3  -1.5  7.6 
Other indirect 
taxes 4.2  8.1  -7.1  5.2 
Personal income 
tax  10.1 -6.2  2.4  6.4 
Corporate 
income tax  2.8 -0.1  1.1 3.9 
Other direct 
taxes  0.8 -0.2  0.6 1.2 
Total 23.7  5.0  -4.4  24.3 
* Including the effect of economic growth on the revenue changes from discretionary 
measures. 
 
Specifically as to the discretionary measures, these boosted VAT receipts on 
average by some 1¼% of the VAT revenue (rather than as percentage of 
GDP as in the table), and increasing excise duties and higher special car 
taxation made other indirect taxes even rise faster. On the other hand, 
changes to direct taxes on net had a revenue-decreasing effect, especially as 
regards the PIT (-3% of PIT receipts). These changes reflect a shift from 
taxation of labour to indirect taxation and environmental levies (indirect tax), 
as well as income tax reforms (e.g. to simplify the tax code) and income tax 
reductions introduced to soften adverse income consequences of structural 
reform measures.  
 
The nominal GDP elasticity of total taxes, also labelled the macroeconomic 
progression factor, on average equals around 1.1. Annual numbers are shown 
in Figure 3. For comparison, we also included the buoyancy, i.e., overall tax 
growth not corrected for discretionary measures, divided by nominal GDP 
growth. The figure shows that correcting for discretionary measures on 
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A noteworthy feature of the tax-to-GDP elasticity is its more volatile behaviour 
since the middle of the 1980s, and especially towards the end of the period. 
This may reflect increases in the number of major tax reforms, where effects 
are hard to forecast. In addition, higher volatility may reflect that GDP 
nowadays is less an indicator for the overall tax base than it used to be. Asset 
price developments (bonds, equity, real estate) play an increasingly important 
role in determining tax receipts, e.g. via stamp duties and deduction of 
mortgage interest payments (see Wolswijk, 2006).
8  The relatively high 1987-
value of the overall elasticity reflects the very low nominal GDP growth in that 
year (just above 1%).  
 
 
4.  Estimation results 
 
All tax variables, which are in log-form, were tested for unit roots using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see annex 2). For the majority of tax 
categories, stationarity was achieved after first-differencing. For two tax 
categories, this was only the case after shortening the sample, namely for the 
                                                 
8 See Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) for an analysis of these effects, Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) 
for empirical evidence on the deficit impact, and Morris and Schuknecht (2007) for the impact of asset 
prices on tax receipts in a number of OECD countries.  
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VAT (1980-2002) and the PIT (1975-2005). This finding supports making a 
distinction between long-term and short-term elasticities.  
 
As regards the long-run tax elasticity estimates, we start with OLS-estimations 
with all data transformed to logs as is standard in this field of research. As 
levels of tax revenues and bases often are non-stationary, estimating the 
long-run equations in levels can give rise to biased estimates and inconsistent 
standard errors. Following Stock and Watson (1993), adding leads and lags of 
the change in the independent variables, leading to Dynamic OLS estimates 
(DOLS), corrects the coefficient bias.  
 
log T05,t = θ + δ log Bt  + Σ
1
j=-1 ø ∆log Bt+j + γt     [9] 
 
Furthermore, Newey-West correction (Newey and West, 1987) was applied to 
reduce inconsistency of the estimates of the standard errors. Thus, as regards 
the long-run estimations, besides results on the basis of OLS we also present 
results using DOLS in combination with the Newey-West technique, which we 
take to be more informative.
9 Generally, we use the current value and one 
lead and one lag of the change in the independent variables to save on 
degrees of freedom. Endogeneity of the tax base should not be problematic in 
this set-up as the tax receipts have been corrected for discretionary measures 
that could have an impact on the tax bases.  
 
After estimating the long-term relation, we tested whether non-stationary 
variables are integrated by a stationarity test on the residuals from the long-
term equations. Results as reported in annex 2 broadly confirm the existence 
of co-integrating relationships.      
 
The results of our estimates for the long-term and the short-term base 
elasticities are presented below for the five tax categories. Where available, 
we also add information on estimated values of elasticities from other 
sources. This relates in particular to the OECD (Van den Noord, 2000), the 
                                                 




Working Paper Series No 763
June 2007 
ECB (Bouthevillain, C., et al., 2001), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis (CPB, 2004) and the IMF (2004). 
 
Value-added tax 
The log of endogenous VAT receipts first was related to private consumption, 
government investment and private residential investment, being the main 
expenditure items on which VAT is levied. While it could make sense to 
distinguish real from purely nominal developments,
10 the ADF-stationarity test 
on inflation gave unsatisfactory results (see Annex 2), so this path was not 
pursued further. Government investment was included but was not significant. 
Private consumption entered the equation for the 1980-2002 sample with 
coefficient 0.82, somewhat below the (theory-based) assumptions of the 
OECD, ECB and CPB. The below-unity elasticity could partially reflect the 
upward effect of higher excise duties levied on some products on inflation. 
While these increases are fully reflected in the price index, consumption may 
decrease in response, leading to less VAT receipts. Estimating with DOLS 
and the Newey-West correction results in a higher coefficient on private 
consumption (0.90) but still significantly different from unity, while residential 




As regards short-term effects (table 2b), the error-correction term was 
included as an explanatory variable, which proved to be significant with a 
coefficient of 0.77. Thus, actual revenues deviating from their long-run value 
are corrected for ¾ in the next period.
11 The coefficient on private 
consumption is only 0.69. In the final column, we allow for an asymmetric 
response, by including the dummy taking value 1 when the error-correction 
term is positive and interacting it with private consumption, and by splitting the 
error-correction terms in positive and negative values. Results indicate that 
                                                 
10 Ginebri et al (2005) show this to be relevant in the case of Italy. 
11 Correlations with OECD and Commission estimates of the output gap and the errors from this and 
following equations for other taxes range between 0.20 and 0.65. Correlations between the errors all 
being positive with one exception gives some but no decisive support to a cyclical interpretation of the 
error-correction term.   
19
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 763 
June 2007 
when revenues are below equilibrium, the elasticity with regard to real 
consumption is 0.56, while when it is above the elasticity rises to 1.01. Such 
pattern could reflect a shift in the consumption pattern towards more basic, 
low-taxed goods and services when consumption and VAT revenues are 
depressed.




In addition, responses of the adjustment term prove to be asymmetrical, as 
witnessed by coefficients differing according to whether the error-correction 
term is positive or negative. These differences are not only significantly 
different from zero but also from each other. In combination with the high 
adjustment coefficient, this could point to consumption of luxury goods and 
services, being higher taxed by VAT, being postponed temporarily. 
Information from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, with the share of 
medium- and high-taxed goods and services in total consumption decreasing 
in recessions, are in line with this idea.
14 
 
<table 2b>  
 
 
Results for the VAT also confirm the crucial role of correcting tax receipts for 
discretionary measures in estimating elasticities. Re-estimating the OLS-
equation for the level of tax receipts (2nd column of table 2a) without any 
correction for discretionary measures delivers markedly different results, the 
elasticity with regard to consumption being 1.15 instead of 0.82, and the 
coefficient on residential investment turning -0.07 instead of 0.16, although 
remaining insignificant. 
 
                                                 
12  For the US, a number of studies also conclude rising income elasticities for durable goods in case of 
economic expansions (see Fox and Campbell, 1984, and Otsuka and Braun, 1999).  
13 An additional factor that could help explain this result is that in recessions the number of 
bankruptcies increases, resulting in the tax office not being able to collect all VAT due. 
14 Between 2000 and 2005, the economy went from a positive to a negative output gap according to 
most estimates. In that period, the share of normally-taxed (6%) and highly-taxed (19%) goods and 
services in total consumption declined both by 3 percent-point, to 21 and 40% respectively, while the 
share of exempted goods and services increased by 6 percentage points, to 39%.  
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Indirect taxes other than VAT 
Indirect taxes other than VAT nowadays mainly includes taxes on new cars, 
excises on mineral oils and tobacco, legal taxes (e.g. stamp duties) and 
environmental levies. Private consumption was used as a rough tax base for 
these taxes, which resulted in a coefficient of 0.43. Given the heterogeneous 
nature of the taxes involved, no a priori expectation of the value of the 
elasticity can be formulated. In addition, the results show that house prices 
exert a significant effect on indirect tax revenues, reflecting stamp duties 
(3.5% of total tax receipts in 2005) increasing when activity on the housing 
market increases. This is in line with findings of the CPB (CPB, 2004). We 
also included oil prices in view of excise duties on mineral oil products (5.5% 
of total tax receipts in 2005) but this did not produce satisfactory results. The 
same equation was estimated with DOLS and the Newey-West correction, 
with the coefficient on private consumption going up (0.55), and the coefficient 
on the housing price effect going down (0.10).   
 
<table 3a>  
 
In the short-run equations, adding the error-correction term produces strong 
and statistically satisfactory results, indicating that around half of the error-
correction is adjusted in the next period. Results also show a relatively weaker 
effect of private consumption and a stronger effect of house prices than in the 
long-run. The IMF (2004) also finds indications of a short-term impact of 
house prices on tax receipts.
15 In the final equation, we included the dummy 
taking value 1 in case actual receipts of other indirect taxes are above the 
long-run value and zero otherwise. This has an impact on the coefficient on 
private consumption, being around 0.3 if taxes are below-equilibrium and 0.6 
if taxes are above-equilibrium. The higher responsiveness when above-
equilibrium presumably could reflect car purchases increasing more rapidly, 
being taxed by a special levy. The error-correction term indicates that some 
2/3 of the long-term disequilibrium is removed in the next period. No 
                                                 
15 The IMF estimates an increase in the base elasticity of total indirect taxes from 1.0 to 1.3 from 1970-
1989 to 1990-2003, which it connects to a larger impact of boom-bust cycles in asset prices. 
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significant difference in response of the error-correction term when being 
above- or below-equilibrium values is found. 
 
<table 3b>  
 
 
Personal income tax (PIT) 
As to personal income taxes, which include wage taxation, we use wages as 
a base.
16 While a decomposition of the wage-sum into in real wage per 
employee, the number of employees, and inflation in principle would be 
preferable
17, the results form the stationarity-test for inflation did not allow this.  
The OLS results for the period 1975-2005 (table 4a) show an overall elasticity 
of 1.4 with regard to the wage-sum income taxation due to increasing 
marginal rates as household wage income increases. House prices have 
been included in view of the deductibility of mortgage interest payments from 
the tax base, and show the expected negative effect. A 2001 dummy 
measures ex-post corrections of revenues lost on account of the 2001 tax 
reform. Results with DOLS and Newey-West correction indicate a somewhat 
larger elasticity of the wage-sum (1.6). Stock market growth had no significant 
impact on the personal income tax revenue, although it is part of the base of 
the personal income tax since 2001. We also did not find satisfactory results 
for the 1990 tax reform having a downward effect on the elasticity (Caminada 
and Goudswaard, 1996). 
 
<table 4a>  
 
Comparing the outcomes with estimates from others is complicated by the 
fact that the latter usually distinguish between the effects of employment and 
of wage per employee, and may also include general insurance contributions 
                                                 
16 Income of self-employed is also taxed via the personal income tax. As income of self-employed is 
not available for a long period, it was approximated by multiplying the number of self-employed by 
average wage income. However, estimations where imputed income of self-employed was taken out of 
corporate profits and allocated to the personal income tax base did not materially deviate from those 
mentioned in the main text and therefore are not reported here.  
17 Inflation and the number of employees usually are assumed to have unity elasticity, while the 
elasticity of real wages per employee should be much higher reflecting the progressive nature of 
income taxation.  
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that nowadays are collected simultaneously by the tax collector. Commonly, 
these studies impose a unitary elasticity with regard to employment (ECB, 
OECD, and CPB). The elasticity with regard to income per employee (of the 
private sector) ranges form 1.9 by the CPB to 2.6 by the ECB and the OECD.  
The IMF reports a rather low elasticity of 1.1 to the nominal wage sum over 
the period 1970-2003 but does not correct for (overall revenue-decreasing) 
discretionary measures, which depresses the estimated elasticity value. 
 
In the short-run equation, the coefficient on wage per employee is higher than 
in the long-run equation (2.0 against 1.57), which could reflect that 
employment in the short run is less flexible than in the long-run.
18 Short-term 
adjustment thus falls more than proportionally on earned wage per person, 
which has a progressive impact on tax receipts. The error-correction term 
proved marginally significant, at close to 50%, while no evidence of 
asymmetry was detected.  
 
<table 4b>  
 
Corporate income tax (CIT) 
Analysing and forecasting corporate income tax receipts is complicated 
because of lags in the effect of corporate profits on tax receipts, possibilities 
for carrying back and forward losses, fiscal profits only being very roughly 
approximated by profits in national accounts
19, and – specific to the 
Netherlands - sizeable tax receipts from natural gas-exploitation (see De 
Boer, 1996). In our OLS estimation, one-year lagged corporate profits gave 
unity elasticity, which is in line with the findings of OECD, the ECB and the 
CPB, the latter allowing for lags up to 2 years. Estimates using DOLS and 
Newey-West correction indicate a value 1.07, significantly different from one, 
which could well reflect its slightly progressive nature resulting from somewhat 
                                                 
18 Short-term economic fluctuations may have relatively little effect on employment, e.g. due to 
complex dismissal procedures or because employers use natural attrition. The standard deviation of the 
log of employment being about 4 times as low as that of the log of wage per person could support this 
view.   
19 For instance, profits in the national accounts are defined on a net basis (profits minus losses) while 




Working Paper Series No 763 
June 2007 
lower rates for small companies. Oil prices – to which the natural gas prices 
are linked – capture corporate tax receipts from the natural-gas sector but do 
not turn out to be significant.
20 
 
<table 5a>  
 
The short-term elasticity with regard to lagged profits is 0.74. The IMF (2004) 
estimates the elasticity at 0.9 but notices an upward trend, possibly related to 
boom-and-bust periods. The coefficient on the error-correction term is around 
0.5.  Finally, we tested for asymmetric behaviour (last column), and indeed 
found evidence that profits spur taxation in case profit taxation is above its 
equilibrium, likely reflecting a strong reduction in possibilities to carry-back or 
carry-forward losses in good times. The lack of a significant effect in case of 
below-equilibrium tax receipts could reflect the possibilities for loss 
compensation.  
 
< table 5b>  
 
Other direct taxes 
Other direct taxes, finally, have been related to corporate profits as dividend 
withholding taxes are the main component. Results indicate a rather strong 
progression effect, the long-term elasticity value being around 1.4, which 
could reflect exemption thresholds. A dummy for the tax reform in 2001 was 
added to reflect a change in dividend pay-out policies towards more cash but 
this did not prove successful. The same applies to the stock market index that 
was included as explanatory variable as other direct taxes included capital 
taxation until 2000. No direct comparison with other estimates is around as 
these taxes usually are lumped together with corporate taxes. 
 
<table 6a>  
 
                                                 
20 Although this approach foregoes many other elements that may have an impact on corporate tax 
receipts, adding more detail does not always deliver better results. In this respect, it can be noted that 
the CPB a few years ago switched back to a simple equation for predicting corporate tax receipts rather 
than trying to capture many of the factors described above (CPB, 2004). 
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The error-correction term was included in the short-term equation but apart 
from the intercept, none of the variables turned out to be significant. Improved 
results were obtained when including the interaction of the dummy for positive 
error-correction terms and profits. Results indicate above-unity elasticity with 
regard to profits in case of positive errors, which may reflect corporations’ 
practice of short-term stabilisation of dividend pay-outs, resulting in stable 
dividend taxes. Only when long-term revenues are above trend do corporate 
profits translate into higher distributed dividend and thus more tax receipts.
21 
However, given the poor fit of the equation, results should be interpreted with 
great caution. 
 
<table 6b>  
 
Table 7 summarises the results as discussed before, showing the elasticity of 
the five tax categories with regard to the main base element, thus foregoing 
other factors that impact on tax revenues.  
 
Table 7. Summary of base elasticities of tax categories
¶ 












 0.90  0.55  1.57  1.07  1.43 
Below 
equilibrium 
0.56 0.33  0.12
¶ -0.52
¶   
Short-term 








-0.80   
Adjustment 














¶  Not significant at the 10%-level.  
 
The table shows that long-term elasticities are within the range for the short-
term elasticities except for the corporate income tax. Noteworthy is the high 
value of the short-term elasticity of the personal income tax, above the long-
term value, which can be explained by slow employment adjustment. Short-
term elasticities differ markedly from long-term values. Another conclusion 
                                                 
21 Brav et al (2003) confirm this dividend payout policy for the US. 
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from his overview is that adjustment parameters for indirect taxes are 
relatively high compared to those for direct taxes.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper considered the short- and long-term base elasticity of taxes in the 
Netherlands. Apart from showing the importance of correcting tax revenue 
series for discretionary policy changes in estimating tax elasticities, it presents 
evidence that short-term elasticities deviate from long-term ones, especially 
for direct taxes. Differences are especially large in “bad times” (tax receipts 
below the long-run equilibrium), which may indicate cautious or lagged 
responses of economic agents, taking short-term developments less-than-fully 
into account on a real-time basis. The outcomes in most cases also indicate 
asymmetry in tax-to-base elasticities. When tax receipts are above the long-
term value, elasticities tend to be higher, likely indicating shifts in consumption 
patterns towards more luxury (higher-taxed) goods and services, reduced 
possibilities for loss-compensation and less cautious dividend pay-out 
policies. The error-correction term is significant in all short-term equations, but 
there is only evidence of an asymmetric effect of the error-correction term for 
VAT-receipts. While error-correction terms may not be interpreted directly as 
cyclical indicators, some correlation seems to be in place, pointing to pro-
cyclical elasticities. 
 
Ignoring that short-term tax elasticities may differ from long-term tax 
elasticities adds to creating ‘budget surprises’ which in fact reflect forecast 
inadequacies. Such appears to be particularly important in times of negative 
surprises (tax receipts being below the long-term value), notably for direct 
taxes where the adjustment path is relatively flat. Ignoring such aspects may 
also contribute to inaccurate (cyclically-adjusted) fiscal indicators on which 
policy actions or recommendations may be based, although it needs to be 
realised that errors in forecasting actual or potential output on average appear 
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The gradual shift in Dutch taxes towards more indirect taxation (especially 
VAT) and less personal income taxation implies a shift to a lower short-term 
and long-term elasticity, implying more short-run stability in receipts and – as 
a counterpart – some decrease in the automatic stabilisation function of the 
tax system, which brings it more in line with the European average. 
 
While this paper has provided insight in the question of short-term and long-
term elasticities, and of asymmetrical short-term elasticities for the case of the 
Netherlands, further work in this area could be foreseen. Open issues that 
deserve attention in follow-up research include possibilities for application of 
this approach to other countries, notably in the EU where cyclically-adjusted 
balances play a major role in the policy debate. Another topic where additional 
work would be beneficial is on ways to turn the analytical tool developed in 
this paper into a forecasting tool that allows an ex-ante calculation of the 











Table 2a. Long-term elasticity of VAT in the Netherlands, 1980-2002 



















    
Adj. R2  0.99  0.99 
s.e. of regression  0.0067  0.0071 






Table 2b. Short-term elasticity of VAT, 1981-2002 




























    
    
Adj. R2  0.51  0.67 
s.e. of regression  0.0078  0.0063 
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Table 3a. Long-term elasticity of other indirect taxes, 1970-2005 
















    
Adj. R2  0.99  0.99 
s.e. of regression  0.0148  0.0099 





Table 3b. Short-term elasticity of other indirect taxes, 1973-2005 









∆ Private consumption * Dresid     0.28 
(2.6)** 








    
Adj. R2  0.67  0.74 
s.e. of regression  0.0090  0.0081 
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Table 4a. Long-term elasticity of personal income taxes, 1975-2005 




















    
Adj. R2  0.99  0.99 
s.e. of regression  0.016  0.020 




Table 4b. Short-term elasticity of personal income taxes, 1976-2005 





House price  -0.08 
(-0.6) 
2001 tax reform dummy  0.08 
(3.3)*** 
Error-correction term(-1)  -0.49 
(-1.9)* 
  
Adj. R2  0.59 
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Table 5a. Long-term elasticity of corporate income tax, 1971-2005 














    
Adj. R2  0.97  0.97 
s.e. of regression  0.046  0.045 




Table 5b. Short-term elasticity of corporate income tax, 1972-2005 









∆ corporate profit (-1) * Dresid    -  0.90 
(2.6)*** 








    
Adj. R2  0.46  0.55 
s.e. of regression  0.034  0.031 






Working Paper Series No 763 
June 2007 
Table 6a. Long-term elasticity of other direct taxes, 1971-2005 












    
Adj. R2  0.96  0.96 









Table 6b.  Short-term elasticity of other direct taxes, 1972-2005 











∆ Corporate profits * Dresid     1.24 
(2.8)*** 






    
Adj. R2  0.01  0.19 
s.e. of regression  0.041  0.037 
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Annex 1: Data sources and methods 
 
Data on discretionary measures (cash basis) and on tax receipts (cash basis, 
partly accrual basis) have kindly been obtained from the Ministry of Finance in 
the Netherlands. We have derived tax series on an approximated accrual 
basis as follows:  
o  For indirect taxes, tax receipts and discretionary measures on a cash 
basis are taken, given limited delay in paying these taxes (nowadays 
usually one month).  
o  As for corporate taxes, we have used available accrual-based receipts 
data and half a year lagged cash data on discretionary measures.  
o  Regarding personal income tax, data refer to accrual-based data as far as 
possible, supplemented by half-a-year lagged cash data where necessary. 
Cash data on discretionary measures have been lagged by half a year.   
o  For other direct taxes, both revenue series and the series on measures 
have been lagged by one year.  
 
o  Tax base for wage and personal income tax: wage income for government 
and business employees. 
o  Tax base for corporate income tax: net exploitation income of the business 
sector  
o  Long-term interest rate, exchange rate Dutch guilder/euro vs. US dollar; 
OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
o  Dutch stock market index: Global Financial Data 
o  Oil price: OECD Economic Outlook 
o  National accounts data: nominal and real gross domestic product, private 
consumption, wage compensation, private consumption, government 
investment, private residential investment, employment: CPB. 
o  Consumer price index: Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) 
o  Housing prices: ECB and BIS 
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Graph A1 below shows the endogenous development of the log of the 5 tax 
- 
around the end of the 1970s, and possibly again towards the beginning 
of the new century. 
-  peaks in personal income taxes and other direct taxes around 2001-
2002. 

































The table below shows the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test on unit roots. The VAT-series initially was not stationary but after taking 
into account a change in trend at the end of the 70s and at the end of the 
period results were satisfactory. Personal income taxes also were found to be 
difference-stationary when taking a shorter sample. Results for the other tax 
categories point to tax series being stationary over the entire sample (1971-
2005) after differencing once.  
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a change in the trend in VAT-receipts and in other indirect taxes 
Annex 2: Unit root test results 
categories distinguished in the main text. Noteworthy developments include:  
Table A2.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for endogenous tax levels, 
1971-2005 





#     1.08  -1.18  -5.04*** 
Other indirect taxes  -0.98  -3.13  -3.43** 
Corporate income tax  -2.13  -3.33*  -4.89*** 
Personal income tax
§ -2.90*  -3.76**  -3.96*** 
Other direct taxes  -0.54  -2.29  -5.51*** 
*, **, *** = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
All estimates include an intercept. 
#  1980-2002. 
§  1975-2005. 
 
 
As to the explanatory variables, most exhibited stationarity after first 
differencing. Inflation is the notable exception, possible related to a trend-
break around the start of the 1980s. Indeed, using shorter time periods 
delivered more satisfactory results, although it reduces the power of the ADF-
test.   
 
Table A2.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for independent variables 






#  1.18 -1.48  -2.79* 
Residential investment
#  0.95 -1.75 -4.28*** 
Inflation -3.44**  -4.18**  -1.37 
Government investment
#  2.34 0.52 -3.88*** 
Corporate profits  -2.05  -2.27  -4.42*** 
Wages
§ -0.98  -3.89***  -2.94** 
House price  2.40  -1.83  -2.92*   
House price
§  -0.54  -1.61  -3.48**   
Oil price  -1.97  -2.07  -5.35*** 
Long-term interest rate  -1.48  -3.48*  -4.67*** 
Stock market index  -0.47  -2.68  -3.84** 
#   Over the sample 1980-2002. 
§   Over the sample 1975-2005. 
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The errors from the long-run equations were tested for stationarity using the 
ADF-test, which revealed satisfactory results (see table below). In view of the 
limited size of our sample and possible non-linear adjustment that are known 
to reduce the power of the test (see e.g. Endes and Siklos, 2001), we did not 
opt for the Johansen cointegration test. Instead, there is a strong theoretical 
presumption of cointegration by the fact that the equations, while including 
behavioural elements, mostly are of an arithmetic nature as there is only 




Table A2.3 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on residuals from long-term DOLS 
equations with Newey-West correction. 
 Level 
Value-added tax  -3.12*** 
Other indirect taxes  -4.73*** 
Personal income tax  -5.34*** 
Corporate income tax  -4.08*** 
Other direct taxes   -1.98** 
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